

TIME, LAWS AND FREE WILL

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Mauro Dorato

“Dispositions, becoming and free will”

Abstract

The traditional debate between compatibilists and libertarians is centered around the question whether a (possible) world governed by deterministic laws would make room for an satisfactory kind a freedom, consisting in the power to do what we want, even if this power fully depends on unchangeable previous events and laws. In addition to such a power, libertarians require some form of ontic indeterminism: there are (at least two) possible futures both compatible with the same past. By first attacking the Humean view of laws, I defend the claim that laws are true only in mathematical models, where the latter describe in a idealized way a world basically inhabited by properties and causes. As a consequence, the traditional formulation of the debate -- that requires laws -- must be thoroughly reconstructed in terms of a metaphysics in which the manifestations of dispositions (namely events) give origin to a local, worldline-dependent and time-asymmetric form of becoming. This type of becoming seems the only way to make sense of the existence of causally effective strategies which bring into being new events